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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Deandre Rudolph, who pled guilty to bribery and sale of 
government property, appeals his sentence on the grounds 
that the district court (1) improperly enhanced hi s sentence 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2C1.1(b)(1), and (2)  improperly 
failed to group the two convictions under U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2. 
Because there was no trial, most of the relevant facts were 
obtained from Rudolph's presentence report. 
 
In March 1995, Gerard Felix, who was arrested on 
charges unrelated to this case, admitted to having made 
corrupt payments to employees of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and other Justice Department 
employees in return for illegal assistance. During the 
course of his subsequent cooperation with the government, 
Felix identified, inter alia, the appellant, Deandre Rudolph, 
an INS Special Agent based in Newark, New Jersey, as one 
of those government employees. Felix told the agents that 
in the fall of 1994, Rudolph had accepted a total of $1,500 
from him in return for an INS metal template, a device that 
imprints a marking when fingerprints and signatures are 
affixed to alien registration "green" cards to demonstrate 
authenticity. Felix cooperated in the ensuing investigation 
of Rudolph, during which several telephone calls between 
Felix and Rudolph were monitored. 
 
In October 1995, Felix asked Rudolph to obtain a federal 
Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the United States 
Probation Office in the Southern District of New York in 
exchange for $1,000. Thereafter, Felix and Rudolph met on 
October 18, 1995 at a diner in Irvington, New Jersey to 
discuss the proposed sale of the presentence report. At that 
meeting, Rudolph requested more specific information 
identifying the subject of the report. 
 
The following day, after Felix provided Rudolph with the 
date of birth of the subject of the report, Rudolph 
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telephoned Felix from his INS office and told him that he 
had the report. They agreed to meet that afternoon to make 
the exchange, but at that meeting Rudolph, who displayed 
the PSR, sought more money than Felix had originally 
offered because the PSR was highly confidential. Ultimately, 
Rudolph accepted the $1,000 for the PSR at a later 
meeting. Rudolph had used an unsuspecting colleague in 
the INS office to obtain the copy of the PSR. 
 
Approximately one month later, on November 21, 1995, 
Rudolph, Felix and Wesley Clement, who was described as 
"an illegal document vendor," met by prearrangement so 
that Clement could purchase an INS metal template from 
Rudolph. During negotiations, Rudolph explained that this 
transaction was riskier than the sale of the template in the 
fall of 1994 because this time there would be "cameras up 
in the ceiling." The three men met again an hour later, and 
Clement turned over $4,000 in cash for the template. 
According to Felix, Clement purchased yet another template 
shortly thereafter. 
 
Rudolph was arrested on December 22, 1995. On 
January 18, 1996, a three-count indictment was filed in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
charging Rudolph with (1) demanding, seeking, and 
receiving a monetary bribe as a public official to make 
opportunities for the commission of fraud by providing an 
I-89 template for use in fraudulent applications to the INS 
for permanent residence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
SS 201(b)(2)(B) and 2; (2) demanding, seeki ng, and receiving 
a monetary bribe as a public official in order to be induced 
to act in violation of his official duty by providing an I-89 
template to a person not authorized to receive it, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 201(b)(2)(C) and 2; and 
(3) converting to his own use and without authorit y selling, 
conveying and disposing of an I-89 metal template 
belonging to the INS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 641 and 2. 
All three counts related to Rudolph's supply of the template 
to Clement in November 1995 in exchange for money. 
 
On March 22, 1996, pursuant to a written plea 
agreement, Rudolph pled guilty to count one of the 
indictment, charging him with receiving a bribe in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 201(b)(2)(B), and waived indictment and pled 
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guilty to a one-count information charging him for the first 
time with sale of government property, namely a 
Presentence Investigation Report, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 641. Counts two and three of the indictment originally 
presented were dismissed. 
 
The district court sentenced Rudolph on October 23, 
1996, to two concurrent 16-month terms of imprisonment, 
to be followed by 3 years of supervised release. In addition, 
the district court ordered Rudolph to pay a $7,500 fine for 
each count of conviction, for a total of $15,000. Final 
judgment was entered on October 28, 1996, and Rudolph 
filed a timely notice of appeal on October 31, 1996.1 
 
II. 
 
Rudolph asserts that it was improper for the district 
court to increase his offense level by two levels under 
U.S.S.G. S 2C1.1(b)(1) based on his admissions to the 
probation department that he had accepted two additional 
bribes that were not the subject of a charge. Section 2C1.1 
provides for a base offense level of ten for "offering, giving, 
soliciting, or receiving a bribe" and mandates a two-level 
increase if the offense "involved more than one bribe or 
extortion." See U.S.S.G. S 2C1.1(b)(1),(2). In reviewing the 
district court's application of S 2C1.1(b)(1), the factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error, while the application 
and interpretation of the Guidelines are subject to plenary 
review. See United States v. Felton, 55 F.3d 861, 864 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
Rudolph is not challenging the court's finding that he 
accepted the two uncharged bribes. In fact, Rudolph 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although the notice of appeal listed only the docket number for 
Rudolph's conviction for the sale of the presentence report, and not the 
docket number for the bribery conviction, the government concedes that 
the omission of the docket number of the latter was an inadvertent 
typographical error as there was functionally only a single prosecution, 
plea hearing, presentence report and sentencing hearing and that 
Rudolph's brief clearly discloses an intent to appeal both convictions. 
The government stipulates notice, as it was neither misled or prejudiced. 
See Brief of Appellee at 3-4. We conclude under these circumstances 
that we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal. 
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acknowledged during the sentencing hearing that he had 
admitted to the probation officer that he accepted bribes for 
three templates, and the district court considered that 
admission in making its finding that Rudolph had accepted 
three bribes. App. at 75. Rudolph's contention is that his 
two uncharged bribes do not qualify as relevant conduct for 
purposes of an enhancement under the sentencing 
guidelines. 
 
Under S 2C1.1(b)(1), the defendant's base offense is 
increased by 2 levels if more than one bribe is involved. In 
determining whether there has been more than one bribe, 
it is necessary to consider "relevant conduct" as defined in 
S 1B1.3. That section defines relevant conduct as "all acts 
and omissions committed, aided, abetted . . . procured, or 
willfully caused by the defendant . . . during the 
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for 
the offense of conviction, or in the course of attempting to 
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense." U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3(a)(1). Where the conduct at issue, if charged, would 
be groupable with a charged offense pursuant toS 3D1.2(d), 
however, the definition of relevant conduct also includes 
"all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted. . . 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that were 
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or 
plan as the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G.S 1B1.3(a)(2). 
See also United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
Offenses can be part of "the same course of conduct" if 
"they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as 
to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single 
episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses." U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3, appl. note 9(B). Similarly, offenses may constitute 
part of a "common scheme or plan" if they are 
"substantially connected to each other by at least one 
common factor, such as common victims, common 
accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi. 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, application note 9(A). 
 
Here, had they been charged, Rudolph's two uncharged 
bribes would certainly have been groupable with the bribe 
charged in count one of the indictment. Thus, it was proper 
for the district court to consider them as relevant conduct 
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if they "were part of the same course of conduct or common 
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3(a)(2). 
 
As indicated in the Presentence Investigation Report, 
Felix was "a highly credible cooperating defendant," and 
provided the probation department with information 
concerning his and Rudolph's respective roles in each of the 
three bribes. That information was corroborated by tape 
recorded conversations and by Rudolph's own admissions. 
Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court'sfinding 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the two uncharged 
bribes were "relevant conduct" as defined by the Sentencing 
Guidelines was erroneous. 
 
Rudolph asserts that relevant conduct that is uncharged 
may not be the basis of a sentencing enhancement. 
However, the Commentary to S 1B1.3 specifically notes that 
"conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element 
of the offense of conviction may enter into the 
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range." 
Accordingly, this court has consistently rejected the 
argument that only charged conduct may be grounds for a 
sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Baird, 109 
F.3d 856, 863 (3d Cir.) ("conduct not formally charged . . . 
can be considered at sentencing"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
243 (1997); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 411 (3rd 
Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's use of uncharged 
conduct for purposes of sentencing determination pursuant 
to S 1B1.3(a)(2)); United Sates v. Pollard, 986 F.3d 44, 47 
(3d Cir. 1993) ("the court may consider uncharged conduct 
in determining whether and how to apply upward or 
downward adjustments"). Cf. United States v. Frierson, 945 
F.2d 650, 652-54 (3d Cir. 1991) ("relevant conduct" 
included offenses that were charged in the indictment but 
dropped pursuant to a plea agreement), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 952 (1992). 
 
Rudolph's principal contention on this issue is that use 
of the uncharged bribes is precluded by our decision in 
United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 1992). 
However, as the district court noted, Thomas is 
distinguishable. In Thomas we held it was impermissible to 
depart upward from the guideline range on the basis of 
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uncharged crimes. Id. at 1120. In this case, the uncharged 
crimes are being used merely as part of the defendant's 
relevant conduct. We thus reject Rudolph's argument that 
Thomas is "controlling." Appellant's Br. at 24-25. 
 
Moreover, we recently held in Baird that "even in the plea 
bargain context, conduct underlying dismissed counts may 
support an upward departure." 109 F.3d at 860. The 
analysis in Baird was informed by the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 635-36 
(1997), which held that a sentencing court could consider 
conduct of which a jury acquitted a defendant. See also 
United States v. Goggins, 99 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(conduct relating to dismissed counts or counts on which 
defendant is acquitted may be germane to imposition of 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1)), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 1347 (1997). As we recognized in Baird, to the 
extent that Thomas is inconsistent with Watts, Watts is 
controlling. Baird, 109 F.3d at 866. 
 
We turn to Rudolph's request that we reject the district 
court's decision to consider his statements to the probation 
officer and "bar the usage of [his] admission based on a 
violation of due process." Appellant's Br. at 20. Rudolph 
argues that he made the admissions concerning the 
additional bribes because he faced an untenable choice 
during his presentence interview with the probation officer. 
He contends that he believed he would have been ineligible 
for the two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to S 3E1.1 if he had refused to 
answer truthfully the probation officer's questions 
concerning the two uncharged bribes. Therefore, faced with 
what he terms a "catch-22" situation because he was 
concerned that an admission of that uncharged conduct 
would expose him to the S 2C1.1(b)(1) enhancement, 
Rudolph, through counsel, chose to acknowledge the 
uncharged conduct in order to obtain the adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility. See App. at 13. 
 
Of course, as Rudolph states in his brief, the guidelines 
permit a defendant to "remain silent in respect to relevant 
conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting 
his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection." 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1 application note 1(a)(emphasis added). In 
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lieu of remaining silent, Rudolph, on the advice of counsel, 
chose to speak. Thus, contrary to his assertion, Rudolph 
was not put to a Hobson's choice, as he did not need to 
offer information on, or even respond to, questions 
concerning relevant conduct beyond the strict parameters 
of his offense of conviction. See United States v. Taylor, 72 
F.3d 533, 551 (7th Cir. 1995). Nothing about the situation 
in which he was placed (which is no different from that in 
which numerous defendants find themselves) implicated his 
rights under the Due Process Clause. While there may have 
been miscalculation by Rudolph's counsel, there was no 
governmental coercion. 
 
There is some suggestion, although no explicit 
accusation, that the probation officer's questions may have 
misled Rudolph and/or his counsel as to the extent of 
Rudolph's responsibility to speak to uncharged conduct. 
Rudolph directs us to nothing in the record to support that 
suggestion. At the sentencing hearing, both parties agreed 
that there was no issue of fact with respect to Rudolph's 
admissions and, although the court arranged for the 
probation officer to be present in the event either party 
wanted her to testify, see App. at 52, neither party called 
her. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, Rudolph's counsel conceded 
that he knew of no authority that would require a probation 
officer to give Miranda warnings. App. at 51. Moreover, it is 
clear from our prior precedent that while a court may 
consider a defendant's candor and remorse concerning a 
charged offense, a defendant's silence concerning 
uncharged conduct will not jeopardize this reduction. See 
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 735 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 853 (1994). We thus reject all of Rudolph's 
arguments based upon the use of his admissions of the two 
uncharged bribes, and hold that the district court neither 
erred nor abused its discretion in enhancing Rudolph's 
sentence pursuant to S 2C1.1(b)(1). 
 
III. 
 
Rudolph also contends that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in refusing to group together for purposes of 
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calculating his appropriate offense level the bribery offense 
and the offense of sale of government property. He argues 
that the two counts should have been grouped pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2, which would have resulted in an offense 
level equal to that for the most serious of the counts in the 
group pursuant to S 3D1.3. Although the plea agreement 
stipulated that the offenses were groupable under 
S 3D1.2(d), it expressly acknowledged that the stipulation 
did not bind the sentencing court. App. at 15. The district 
court found that the crimes did not "involve substantially 
the same harm," U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2, and therefore did not 
group the offenses. Accordingly, the district court adopted 
a final guideline range of 12 to 18 months instead of the 10 
to 16 month range that defendant sought. The 16 month 
sentence Rudolph actually received would have fallen 
within either range. 
 
Our review of the district court's interpretation and 
construction of the guidelines in refusing to group multiple 
offenses under S 3D1.2 is plenary. See United States v. 
Griswold, 57 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 
S. Ct. 428 (1995); United States v. Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 537 
(3d Cir. 1995). The district court's factual findings in 
determining whether the offenses charged were part of one 
overall scheme or a continuing course of criminal conduct 
are reviewed for clear error. Griswold, 57 F.3d at 295; 
Bush, 56 F.3d at 537-38. 
 
The rationale underlying grouping for sentencing 
purposes is to prevent the imposition of "multiple 
punishment for substantially identical offense conduct." 
See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 Pt. D, intro. comment. In that effort, the 
sentencing guidelines provide that "all counts involving 
substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into 
a single Group." U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2. See Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 
at 1425 ("The purpose [of S 3D1.2] is to impose incremental 
punishment for significant additional criminal conduct, but 
at the same time prevent double punishment for essentially 
the same conduct.") (internal quotations omitted). In 
addition, the concept of grouping was adopted, at least in 
part, "[i]n order to limit the significance of the formal 
charging decision." U.S.S.G. Ch. 3 Pt. D, intro. comment. 
Nevertheless, courts have not been given carte blanche to 
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use their authorization to group offenses for sentencing 
purposes as a vehicle to override a prosecutor's decision to 
charge certain offenses and not others. Rather, counts may 
be grouped by the court only when they meet the specific 
requirements listed in U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2. 
 
The general principle applicable to grouping is set forth 
in the first sentence of S 3D1.2 under the heading "Groups 
of Closely-Related Counts" and provides, "[a]ll counts 
involving the same harm shall be grouped together in a 
single group." The guideline then gives four circumstances 
when "[c]ounts involve substantially the same harm within 
the meaning of this rule" and are to be grouped.2 These 
cover (a) counts involving a single victim and a single 
incident, (b) counts involving a single victim and  connected 
incidents, (c) offenses in which one count is also  a specific 
offense characteristic of another count, and (d)  offenses 
where guidelines are based primarily on quantity or 
contemplate continuing conduct. Unless the circumstances 
fall within the language of one of the four subsections, the 
offenses cannot be grouped. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The relevant language in full is: 
 
       All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped 
       together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same 
       harm within the meaning of this rule: 
 
       (a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or 
       transaction. 
 
       (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or 
       transactions connected by a common criminal objective or 
       constituting part of a common scheme or plan. 
 
       (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a 
       specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the 
       guideline applicable to another of the counts. 
 
       (d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of 
the 
       total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance 
       involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the 
       offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the 
       offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2. 
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The guideline enumerates those offenses that are eligible 
for grouping under subsection (d) and those that are not. 
See Seligsohn, 981 F.2d at 1425. Because the offenses at 
issue here, covered by S 2B1.1 (theft) andS 2C1.1 (bribery), 
are eligible for grouping the grouping determination must 
be made based upon the facts of the case, and the 
applicable guidelines (including specific offense 
characteristics and other adjustments) used to determine 
the offense level. 
 
In this case, the government stipulated in the plea 
agreement that Rudolph's offenses should be grouped 
pursuant to subsection (d) of S 3D1.2. App. at 19. That is 
the subsection Rudolph proffered in the district court, and 
the subsection the district court addressed at Rudolph's 
sentencing hearing. Subsection (d) authorizes grouping 
"[w]hen the offense level is determined largely on the basis 
of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of the 
substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate 
harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in 
nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such 
behavior." U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(d) (emphasis added). 
 
We have previously explained that the language in 
subsection (d) emphasized above "is intended to require 
grouping where the offense conduct is ongoing or 
continuous and the offense level provided by the applicable 
offense guideline already takes into account the fact that 
there has been a course of harmful conduct." United States 
v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis 
added). Thus, subsection (d) seeks to eliminate duplication 
created by what is, in essence, merely an aggregation of 
harm or a course of conduct that has already been taken 
into account by the setting of the offense level. 
 
The district court assumed, without deciding, that 
Rudolph's offense conduct was ongoing and continuous but 
deemed it doubtful that accepting bribes and stealing a 
presentence report constitute the type of ongoing criminal 
conduct envisioned by S 3D1.2(d).3  App. at 67. The court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We will make the same assumption of continuity, despite similar 
doubt. We reject the theory offered by Rudolph's counsel at oral 
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following our analysis in Ketcham, determined that 
grouping pursuant to S 3D1.2 was inappropriate because 
Rudolph's "offense levels provided by the applicable 
guidelines do not take into account a course of harmful 
conduct." App. at 67-68. We cannot find error in the 
district court's application of S 3D1.2(d). 
 
It is clear from the language of subsection (d) that if the 
offense level is not determined on the basis of amount of 
harm or loss, then grouping is not authorized under this 
subsection based on continuing conduct unless the offense 
guideline expressly takes into account the continuing 
nature of the conduct. An example of a guideline that does 
so appears in U.S.S.G. S 2G2.2(b)(4), which provides for a 
5-level increase "[i]f the defendant engaged in a pattern of 
activity." In contrast, nothing in SS 2B1.1 or 2C1.1, the 
guideline sections under which Rudolph was sentenced, 
explicitly takes into account a continuing course of 
conduct. Although S 2C1.1(b)(1) provides for an 
enhancement if there is more than one bribe, and 
Rudolph's offense level was enhanced accordingly because 
he took more than one bribe in exchange for INS templates, 
that enhancement did not encompass, and was not in any 
way based upon, Rudolph's theft of the Presentence 
Investigation Report. Yet those are the two offenses 
Rudolph argues we should group. 
 
In Bush, we stated that in grouping decisions "courts 
must distinguish between occasions when increasing the 
punishment for an additional count would punish the 
defendant for conduct taken into account in another count 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
argument that because the theft and two of the bribes were arranged 
and/or monitored by the government, Rudolph's activities were ongoing 
or continuous in nature. Rudolph's first two offenses were separated by 
approximately one year and, although Felix played a role in both, there 
is no evidence that Clement, who was the source of funds in the 
template bribe offense, had any connection to the theft of the PSR. See 
Bush, 56 F.3d at 541 (holding that district court would have acted 
properly in finding that defendant's five firearms purchases over a period 
of several months did not constitute a continuing course of conduct 
where guns were not purchased with funds from a common source nor 
were they all to be used for a particular purpose). 
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and those occasions when the added counts reflect 
additional criminal culpability." 56 F.3d at 538. Thus, in 
Griswold, we affirmed the district court's refusal to group 
certain firearms offenses where, as here, the defendant's 
"multiple counts encompassed numerous instances of 
illegal conduct" and the offense guideline under which 
defendant had been sentenced did not cover multiple 
violations such that defendant would be punished for the 
same conduct under different counts. 57 F.3d at 296-97; cf. 
United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1303-06 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding that three firearms offenses which were 
based on essentially one instance of criminal conduct 
should have been grouped). 
 
Here, the district court noted that in Bush we stated that 
the guidelines provide that "[a]ll counts involving essentially 
the same harm shall be grouped into a single Group," 56 
F.3d at 538, but it reasoned that Rudolph's offenses caused 
analytically distinct harms. Admittedly, both of Rudolph's 
offenses compromised the public's trust in the government 
and its officials because a government official was involved. 
However, as the district court noted, Rudolph's acceptance 
of the bribes in exchange for templates could have enabled 
untold numbers of illegal aliens to create illegitimate proofs 
of residence in the United States, and thereby "undermines 
the United States policy on immigration by permitting a 
virtual unlimited number of persons to obtain permanent 
residency in this country." App. at 69. Rudolph's action in 
using his access to other public employees to obtain and 
sell a presentence report caused a distinct harm; it violated 
the privacy of the subject of the PSR by disseminating 
personal and confidential information about him or her to 
those who have no legitimate basis to read it, with 
additional potential resultant harm. App. at 69-70. 
 
Rudolph may have recognized on appeal that he fits 
within neither of the situations covered by subsection 
3D1.2(d), in that the offense levels of the relevant guidelines 
were not determined on the basis of aggregate harm or loss 
and they were not written to cover behavior that is"ongoing 
or continuous" in nature. Indeed, his appellate brief makes 
only scant effort to justify grouping under that subsection, 
despite the fact that subsection (d) was the cited basis for 
 
                                13 
  
grouping in the stipulation. Instead, he argues, apparently 
for the first time, that grouping was also appropriate under 
subsections (b) and (c) of S 3D1.2. Because those 
arguments were not raised before the district court, we 
review for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
By its terms, S 3D1.2(b) applies only to counts involving 
the same victim. U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(b). According to the 
guideline commentary, "[f]or offenses in which there are no 
identifiable victims . . ., the `victim' for purposes of 
subsections (a) and (b) is the societal interest that is 
harmed." U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2, appl. note 2. See also Griswold, 
57 F.3d at 295-96 (citing application note 2 to S 3D1.2). As 
our discussion above suggests, one of the primary societal 
interests jeopardized by Rudolph's acceptance of the bribes 
was the integrity and efficacy of the nation's immigration 
policies, arguably a victimless crime. In contrast, the theft 
of the PSR was directed to an identifiable victim-- the 
individual for whom the PSR was prepared. Accordingly, the 
two offenses involved different victims, rendering subsection 
(b) of S 3D1.2 inapplicable. 
 
Subsection (c) authorizes grouping "[w]hen one of the 
counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific 
offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the 
guideline applicable to another of the counts." U.S.S.G. 
S 3D1.2(c) (emphasis added). Rudolph argues that this 
subsection applies because the abuse of his position of 
trust and authority was embodied in the bribery count and 
was used as the basis for an upward adjustment on the 
theft count. 
 
In Griswold, we rejected an argument similar to that 
made by Rudolph here. There, the defendant argued that 
his status as a convicted felon was an essential element of 
one offense and a factor in setting the base offense level in 
another. Griswold, 57 F.3d at 296. Unpersuaded, we noted 
that "no conduct embodied in one of the counts is used . . . 
in the determination of the offense level for another count. 
Griswold's status as a convicted felon is implicated in 
establishing the base offense level for each offense. 
However, no separate conduct by Griswold resulted in 
double counting." Id. at 296-97. Accordingly, we held that 
subsection (c) did not apply. 
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Similarly, although Rudolph's status as a public official 
affected both counts on which he was sentenced, the two 
counts addressed distinct criminal acts, neither of which 
encompassed conduct that affected Rudolph's sentence for 
the other. We therefore cannot find that the district court's 
failure to group the offenses under subsection (c) of section 
3D1.2 constituted error, much less plain error. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction and sentence.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This opinion takes no position with respect to the concurring opinion 
of Chief Judge Becker which is directed to the Sentencing Commission 
rather than to the disposition of the case before us. 
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BECKER,***** Chief Circuit Judge, concurring. Of the 
myriad challenges facing the Sentencing Commission when 
it drafted the Sentencing Guidelines, few were greater than 
the task of fashioning clear and sensible rules for the 
grouping of offenses. While what emerged in U.S.S.G. 
S 3D1.2 is a generally sensible and workable set of 
principles, this case suggests to me that facets of the 
grouping Guidelines are forced, and result in formalistic 
rather than common sense dispositions that yield results 
contrary to the Commission's intent to limit the significance 
of the charging decision. While I join in Judge Sloviter's 
carefully written opinion for the court, and in the judgment, 
I write separately to suggest that the grouping guidelines 
would benefit from a redraft that would elevate substance 
and common sense over form. My comments thus pertain 
only to Part III of the opinion of the court. I note that, from 
its earliest days, the Commission has urged the federal 
judiciary to make suggestions for Guideline revision, 
viewing them as a means of implementing the ongoing 
monitoring process. See U.S.S.G. Ch.1 Pt. AS 4(b) (stating 
that Commission will analyze judicial decisions to 
determine how to refine Guidelines); see also United States 
v. Woods, 24 F.3d 514, 518 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing 
same). To its great credit, the Commission has frequently 
acted upon such suggestions. 
 
I 
 
I see the case as follows. Prior to the offenses of 
conviction, Rudolph was known by the government's 
informant, Felix, to have sold stolen government property in 
return for bribes. The events leading to both the bribery 
offense and the sale of government property (i.e. theft) 
offense at issue involved an offer to pay a sum of money in 
return for goods stolen from the Justice Department. In the 
instance leading to the theft conviction, Felix made the 
illicit offer. In the instance leading to the bribery conviction, 
Felix facilitated an offer made by a third-party, Wesley 
Clement. In both cases: (1) Rudolph and his buyer haggled 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*****Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
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over the amount of the bribe; (2) Rudolph used his  position 
with the INS to facilitate the transaction; and (3)  the end 
result was precisely the same -- a theft of government 
property in return for a bribe. 
 
Under the standard for S 3D1.2(d) grouping announced in 
United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1996), 
grouping is appropriate if: (1)  the defendant's o ffense 
behavior has been found to be continuous or ongoing, and 
(2) the offense guidelines take his ongoing course  of 
conduct into account. See S 3D1.2(d) (offense guidelines 
must be "written to cover" ongoing offense behavior). Both 
the district court and this court have assumed that 
Rudolph's behavior was ongoing and continuous, see Op. at 
n.3, and the facts supporting the charged offenses, 
combined with the fact that Rudolph admitted to two other 
(uncharged) bribes in return for INS templates on two other 
occasions, suggest that this assumption is correct. 
 
As previously noted, grouping pursuant to subsection (d) 
also requires that the offense guidelines "already take into 
account the fact that there has been a course of harmful 
conduct." Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 796. The court concludes 
that neither S 2B1.1 nor S 2C1.1, the relevant offense 
guidelines here, explicitly takes a continuing course of 
conduct into account, and hence that Rudolph's offenses 
should not be grouped. While the court has correctly 
applied the law, I find this outcome extremely troubling. 
The express purpose of the grouping guidelines is to limit 
the significance of the formal charging decision and to 
prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical 
offense conduct, while still ensuring incremental 
punishment for significant additional conduct. See U.S.S.G. 
Ch. 3 Pt. D, intro. comment. The problem with S 3D1.2(d) 
is that, in spite of these goals, it requires that the offense 
guidelines be written to cover ongoing offense behavior. In 
other words, if we read the Guidelines literally, we could, as 
intimated in Ketcham, supra, be forced to reject a grouping 
because of how the offense guidelines are written when the 
reality of the offense conduct clearly shows substantially 
identical conduct. This seems to be an unnecessary and 
untoward exercise in formalism, with the added vice of 
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effectively bringing the charging process back to the center 
of the sentencing calculus.1 
 
That is what happened here. In my view, the key criminal 
behavior underlying both of Rudolph's offenses is the theft 
of government property in return for bribes. The only 
difference is the particular item Rudolph was asked to steal 
from the Justice Department closet. Yet, because one 
offense was charged as a bribe and sentenced under 
S 2C1.1, and the other offense was charged as a sale of 
government property and sentenced under S 2B1.1, the 
offenses are held not to be groupable.2  Thus, it is the 
charging decision and not the actual offense conduct that 
is ultimately controlling the sentence here. 
 
The court correctly states that we have not been given 
the authority to group offenses "carte blanche" in order to 
"override a prosecutor's decision to charge certain offenses 
and not others," and that we are limited to the textual 
dictates of S 3D1.2. Op. at 9-10, 11. The court's statements, 
however, point out precisely the tension that currently 
exists between the policy behind the grouping notion, the 
purpose of which is, I reiterate, to limit the significance of 
the formal charging decision and to prevent multiple 
punishment for substantially identical offense conduct 
while still ensuring incremental punishment for significant 
additional conduct, and the actual directions that we are 
given in the Guidelines themselves. Not only are we not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The problem with S 3D1.2 highlighted by this case is also reflective of 
a larger, systemic shift caused by the adoption of the Guidelines, for 
that 
regime has, as many commentators have recognized, worked a massive 
transfer of discretionary power from the courts to the U.S. Attorneys' 
offices. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 926-28 (1991). 
 
2. Section 2C1.1(b)(1) provides for a base offense level enhancement if 
more than one bribe is involved in the offense. As the court notes, see 
Op. at 12, Rudolph was subject to this enhancement because "he took 
more than one bribe in exchange for INS templates." If the PSI sale had 
been charged as a bribe, it could also have been considered in this 
multiple-bribe analysis, rendering grouping of the offenses appropriate. 
See also Op. at 5 (noting that had Rudolph's two uncharged bribes been 
charged, they would have been groupable with the bribe charged in 
count one of the indictment). 
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given power to override the charging decision, but under 
S 3D1.2(d) as presently drafted, we are powerless to look 
beyond the charging decision because we must adhere to 
the text of the offense guidelines -- and not the actual 
offense conduct -- to decide if grouping is appropriate. 
What the foregoing analysis suggests is that the grouping 
guidelines suffer from a drafting flaw, for this result is not, 
I submit, what the Commission really intended. Neither is 
it good policy if that was the intended result. 
 
II 
 
This functional type of approach is also necessary to 
avoid analogous pitfalls arising under our current 
construction of S 3D1.2(b). Under that subsection, multiple 
counts are groupable when they "involve the same victim" 
and constitute "part of a common scheme or plan." See 
S 3D1.2(b). According to the guideline application notes, 
when there is no identifiable victim, the "victim" for 
purposes of a S 3D1.2(b) analysis is "the societal interest 
that is harmed." See id., appl. note 2. In the present case, 
the court has rejected Rudolph's subsection (b) claim (i.e. 
that his theft and bribery offenses were part of a common 
scheme and involved the same victim) based on the 
conclusion that the primary societal interest affected by 
"Rudolph's acceptance of the bribes was the integrity and 
efficacy of the nation's immigration policies," whereas the 
victim of the PSI theft offense was the individual with 
respect to whom the PSI was prepared. See Op. at 14. As 
we are reviewing here for plain error, see Op. at 14, I 
cannot fault this result. The court's subsection (b) victim 
analysis, however, suffers from the same reliance on 
formalisms that hampers the subsection (d) analysis. 
 
There are at least two ways to look at a bribery offense 
when we try to assess who is the "victim" of the crime. On 
the one hand, we could examine the nature of the 
individual who accepted the bribe. On the other hand, we 
could also examine the nature of the task or property that 
was exchanged as consideration for the bribe. In this case, 
the court has chosen to assess solely the nature of the 
consideration to determine who or what is the "victim." Not 
surprisingly, the court concludes that the stolen INS 
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template affects the integrity of the immigration laws while 
the PSI affects the individual who is its subject. But if we 
had looked instead to the nature of the bribe acceptor, our 
analysis would have been quite different. In both Rudolph's 
bribery and sale of government property offenses, we would 
find a Justice Department official who jeopardized the 
integrity of his agency by accepting bribes. Viewed in that 
light, in both instances the harm caused would be the 
undermining of the citizenry's trust in government and its 
officials. Indeed, the district court noted that this was a 
common ground between Rudolph's offenses. See App. at 
69-70. 
 
The unfortunate result of the court's analysis is that a 
defendant like Rudolph who is charged with stealing one 
template and one PSI (even though there was evidence that 
Rudolph had stolen another template) is not eligible to have 
his offenses grouped, whereas if he happened to be charged 
with stealing the two templates, his offenses could have 
been grouped under subsection (b). By limiting our analysis 
to one side of the bribery equation, our interpretation of the 
Guidelines enforces formalism over the plain reality that 
there was one criminal scheme and it just so happened that 
the defendant was caught stealing a template and a PSI 
rather than two templates or two PSIs. 
 
Moreover, application note 2 to S 3D1.2 also states: 
 
       [T]he "victim" for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) [in 
       non-identifiable victim cases] is the societal interest 
       that is harmed. In such cases, the counts are grouped 
       together when the societal interests that are harmed 
       are closely related. . . . Ambiguities should be resolved 
       in accordance with the purpose of this section as 
       stated in the lead paragraph, i.e., to identify and group 
       "counts involving substantially the same harm." 
 
This application note demonstrates the Commission's 
recognition that the determination of what interest is 
harmed will necessarily be analytically imprecise. I believe, 
therefore, that this note directs us to rely ultimately not on 
a metaphysical parsing of what elements of society were 
harmed, but, so long as the societal interests are closely 
related, on whether the real elements of the offense suggest 
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that there is only one ultimate harm embodied in both 
counts. See United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1305 
(3d Cir. 1991) (applying earlier version of application note 
2 and basing grouping decision on S 3D1.2 policy grounds). 
While I agree that the subject of the PSI is properly 
identified as a victim, I believe that because there has been 
a theft of Justice Department property, the government and 
the attendant societal interests are also implicated as 
victims by the sale of the PSI, and that a less formalistic 
approach could therefore suggest that grouping is 
appropriate here. 
 
My approach is supported by a recent Seventh Circuit 
decision addressing a related "same victim" question. In 
United States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 1996), the 
defendant pled guilty to charges of money laundering and 
mail fraud arising out of a Ponzi scheme. Relying on a line 
of authority that proposed that the victim of mail fraud is 
the person defrauded, while the victim of money laundering 
is society at large, the government argued that these two 
offenses were inappropriate for grouping under subsection 
(b) because they involved different victims, and thus 
different harms. See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 283. Although 
finding the government's contention to be correct in the 
abstract, the court disagreed that this theoretical victim 
analysis compelled the conclusion that grouping was 
inappropriate: 
 
       [W]hen the defendant is convicted of laundering the 
       proceeds of his fraud . . . as Wilson was here, there is 
       intuitive force to the argument that the victim of the 
       fraud is also a victim of the transaction designed to 
       hide or "cleanse" the funds of which she was 
       defrauded. 
 
Id. (internal citation omitted). I believe the Seventh Circuit's 
decision to apply its "intuitive force" rationale in these 
circumstances once again demonstrates that we must look 
to the actual offense conduct and the nature of the criminal 
scheme involved -- and not just rely on abstract victim 
analysis or other formalisms -- to give meaning to the 
Commission's intent behind the grouping guidelines. 
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III 
 
The animating purpose of the grouping rules is to identify 
and recognize when multiple counts of conviction"are so 
closely intertwined with other offenses that conviction for 
them ordinarily would not warrant increasing the guideline 
range," and to sanction accordingly. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. 
D. intro. comment; see also Wilson, 98 F.3d at 282 (basic 
goal of S 3D1.2 is to combine offenses involving closely 
related counts). To impose sentences consistent with this 
purpose, federal sentencing judges must be able to assess 
the factual realities of the conduct underlying the 
convictions to determine when the counts are related 
enough to demand grouping. Section 3D1.2(d), as currently 
written, and S 3D1.2(b), as currently construed, stand in 
the way of this process, and the sentence imposed on 
Deandre Rudolph bears this out. 
 
Therefore, in addition to the revised construction of 
subsection (b) proposed supra, I also suggest to the 
Sentencing Commission that a redraft of S 3D1.2(d) may be 
in order. One possibility would be to draft an application 
note relating to the list of specific offenses that "are to be 
grouped" under subsection (d).3 The new note could state 
that inclusion of the offenses at issue on this list raises a 
rebuttable presumption that grouping is appropriate so 
long as the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in 
nature, and so long as the purposes of the guidelines would 
be served by grouping the counts. By the terms of this 
presumption, grouping could be appropriate even in the 
absence of explicit language in the offense guidelines 
accounting for a continuing course of conduct. This would 
leave the grouping analysis to the judgment of the district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.Section 3D1.2(d) includes a list of offense guidelines, the offenses 
covered by which "are to be grouped under this subsection." See 
S 3D1.2(d). Our current construction of that subsection teaches that 
inclusion on this list does not mean that grouping is to be automatic, see 
United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1425 (3d Cir. 1992); see also 
United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321, 322 (11th Cir. 1992) (cited in 
Seligsohn) (grouping pursuant to the subsection (d) "to be grouped' list 
not automatic because in some circumstances automatic grouping may 
detract from main purposes of S 3D1.2). 
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court, rather than mandating its reliance on the formalities 
of the charging process.4 
 
Another possibility would be to eliminate the "written to 
cover such behavior" clause entirely, and replace it with 
language requiring that the offense conduct underlying the 
potentially groupable counts be "closely intertwined." In 
that case, subsection (d) would read: 
 
       . . . or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous 
       in nature and the offense behavior underlying one of 
       the counts is closely intertwined and represents 
       substantially the same type of wrongful conduct as 
       another of the counts. 
 
Yet another possibility would be to replace the"written to 
cover" clause with a more general cross-reference to the 
policy goals outlined in the in the introductory comment to 
Chapter 3, Part D. In that case, the subsection could read: 
 
       . . . or if the offense behavior is ongoing and 
       continuous in nature and the decision to group is 
       necessary to prevent multiple punishment for 
       substantially identical offense conduct. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. One can see this type of approach being applied in other cases that 
functionally construe S 3D1.2(d). For example, the Eighth Circuit has 
held that a S 2F1.1 (fraud/counterfeiting) offense and a theft offense 
should be grouped under subsection (d) when they both arise out of the 
defendant's theft and forgery of U.S. Treasury instruments. See United 
States v. Manuel, 912 F.2d 204, 206-07 (8th Cir. 1990). The court 
concluded that: 
 
       Guideline section 3D1.2(d) specifically lists Guidelines sections 
       2F1.1 and 2B1.1 as offenses that can be grouped together. U.S.S.G. 
       S 3D1.2(d). In light of the fact that these two counts both arose 
out 
       of Manuel's theft of United States Treasury instruments, we believe 
       that the counts are sufficiently linked to merit being grouped 
       together for purposes of section 3D1.2(d). 
 
Id. The Manuel court, having found that the two offenses at issue are 
included among the "to be grouped" list of 3D1.2(d), did not find it 
necessary to probe further. Instead, it considered whether grouping on 
the facts of the case would advance the policies behind S 3D1.2 by 
assessing whether the offenses were "sufficiently linked." 
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I acknowledge that either type of amendment might 
generate new ambiguities in application. Such new 
ambiguities, however, would revolve around the actual facts 
of the case and the policies of S 3D1.2, and not around the 
abstract language of the offense guidelines. I believe that 
such an change could help remove the charging process 
from the analysis, as the Commission apparently intended, 
and relocate sentencing discretion with the sentencing 
judge. 
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